



## **ACADEMIC TERRORISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROSTITUTION: A STUDY OF THE RESEARCH SCENARIO IN THE PRESENT WORLD**

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### **Introduction:**

There is no such thing, in the world's history, as an independent press. Everybody knows it. There is not one of us who dare to write an honest opinion, and if one did, you know beforehand that it would never appear in print and any of us who would be foolish as to write honest opinions would be out on the streets looking for another job. If one allows ones honest opinions to appear in one issue of a paper, before twenty four hours, the occupation would be gone. The business of the journalist is to destroy the truth, to lie outright, to pervert, to vilify and to sell his country and his race for his daily bread. Everybody knows it and what folly is this toasting of an independent press? We are the jumping jacks, they pull the strings and we dance. Our talents, our possibilities and our lives are all the property of other men and we are intellectual prostitutes. The system of journal editing existing in our field at the present time virtually forces academics to become prostitutes: they sell themselves for money (and a good living). Unlike prostitutes who sell their bodies for money, academics sell their soul to conform to the will of others, the referees and editors, in order to gain one advantage, namely publication. Obviously, getting published is the most important factor of an academic's career. However, to get into the top journals of your field, your work has to be approved by the editors and referees. If the editor accepts your paper in the first round, several anonymous referees review it and offer suggestions for improvements. They also hold veto power, and your paper can be rejected by any referee. Only once you have made all the "suggested" changes and this may go for several revisions, will you have a chance of being accepted for publication. Making the revisions forces you to publish something different from your original work under the demands of an anonymous person. It also costs precious time, and time is always ticking on your academic career. This presents a dissonance in the system because referees have the power to dictate changes to a paper, but no property rights in the journals. They may appear to act in the journal's interest, but there is no economic benefit to them for doing so. This is a somewhat one-sided presentation of the refereeing process. The main reason for refereeing journal articles, is of course to offer some sort of quality control mechanism which is not just subject to the will of an editor and a couple of assistants. Any editor worth their salt wants to publish decent articles that truly are of interest. Choice of referee is crucial, particularly if, as an expert in their field, they may have a bias one way or another. It is therefore important to choose referees whose views can be contrasted with one another in order to give the editor some kind of overall picture of how the work fits in to the existing state of research. Of course, it is highly frustrating for the author should they be asked to rewrite repeatedly and is indicative of a sloppy editorial process. Good quality journals are likely to either reject, or ask for one rewrite at most. But let us not lose sight of the reason why this process exists, and the fact that it is there to safeguard the quality of published research as much as possible. Sadly, what frequently happens is merely a referees' power trip; a perversion into non-science; or, in some cases leads to intellectual theft by the referees. The suggested solution(s) could be an improvement if constructive comment and

dialogue is present. So research is just one endless train of quasi-sexual favors in modern academia. Here's to hoping the system changes, but it doesn't look like it'll come anytime soon. It is not well understood if there's necessarily any other way for the system to work, but clearly publishing is compulsory for successful academic careers, regardless of the actual merits and benefit of publishing as an activity. This seems to the researcher a simple extension of an exercise (as begun in the U.S. in primary and secondary schools ) compelling students to form, expose, and articulate opinions on matters in which they have no actual interest. One should remember that, being forced to write a book report on a novel every page is an excruciating agony. There's definitely value in this exercise, since a facility for forming articulate opinions is important, but it really should have been spelled out more clearly the point of it all.

They are well aware of the fact that they only have a chance to get the paper accepted if they slavishly follow the demands formulated. The system of journal editing existing in our field at the present time virtually forces academics to become prostitutes: they sell themselves for money (and a good living). Unlike prostitutes who sell their bodies for money, academics sell their soul to conform to the will of others, the referees and editors, in order to gain one advantage, namely publication. Most persons refusing to prostitute themselves and to follow the demands of the system are not academics: they cannot enter, or have to leave, academia because they fail to publish. Their integrity survives, but the persons disappear as academics. This paper discusses the process forcing persons wanting to pursue a university career to act as intellectual prostitutes. Intellectual or academic prostitution is defined here as acting against one's convictions in order to get a reward. The reason for such academic prostitution is seen to lie in the institutions of journal editing currently existing. This system essentially accords veto power to every referee.<sup>1</sup> A prospective author therefore has to meet the demands formulated by the referees in order to have a chance of having the paper accepted for publication. Some readers may feel that intellectual prostitution is not morally objectionable *per se*, but simply a particular choice made by would-be authors. This is correct; prostitution can be looked at as a normal market activity without any moral connotation.<sup>2</sup> The problem is that both the production and consumption activities going with academic prostitution produce undesirable outcomes. It is neither beneficial to the suppliers of academic prostitution nor to its consumers. A major reason for this failure to produce good results lies in the fact that the (anonymous) referees have no property rights on the journals they advise. Other readers may think that the kind of prostitution discussed here is unavoidable. The fundamental fact of scarcity forces all of us to adjust our behavior in order to survive. Suppliers wanting to sell their goods and services must carry out the wishes of the potential customers. Scholars are seen as performing a similar activity to artists, in particular painters who, since the Renaissance, are expected to express their own beliefs and convictions – which led to an explosion of creativity in the arts. The almost dictatorial demands advanced by the referees are difficult, or even impossible, to reconcile with authors wanting to publish their own ideas in journals.

### **1.1 Evolution of Academic Prostitution:**

The researcher's first decision is whether he wants to submit an article to a scholarly paper or not. Only if he is willing to submit does he have a chance of eventually publishing the paper and entering and staying in academia. After considerable time has passed (today one year is not unusual), the editor of the journal either rejects the paper in the first round or demands the revisions found necessary by the referees. The author's second decision is whether to make revisions according to

these demands and therewith prostitute himself academically, or withdraw. In the latter case, the author has the gratification of keeping his intellectual purity, but time has been lost and the chance of a university career vanishes. If the author revises according to the demands of the referees, the editor takes the final decision of whether to reject or accept the paper for publication with a given probability. In the case of rejection, the author has expended considerable work effort to please the referees, has lost even more time, something like two years is not unrealistic, and has to carry the moral cost of having had to prostitute himself. The effort, time and moral costs also apply in the case of acceptance, but they are counterbalanced by the benefits of having an article published, and therewith being able to enter or stay in academia. An author is more likely to intellectually prostitute himself rather than withdraw, the higher the (subjectively expected) chance of final acceptance and the lower the (expected) revision work effort, the higher the cost of time for the revision and the lower his moral cost of prostitution. This game captures the essence of the academic publication process as the researcher observes it. It allows us to focus on the crucial determinants of the process.

### **1.2 Moral Costs of Intellectual Prostitution:**

The utility loss experienced by scholars who are confronted with undesired demands for revisions by referees depends on various factors. It is useful to distinguish between two extreme types: (a) An "autonomous person" with a strong identity has well-developed ideas of his own and therefore suffers high costs from intellectual prostitution. Older and more successful persons are more likely to belong to this category than young and less successful ones. As a consequence, the former are less likely to engage in the publication process and pursue an academic career. Young scholars, in contrast, may find it less taxing to yield to the demands of referees and therefore are more likely to submit papers to refereed journals. (b) "Other-directed persons" have low costs to adjust to the demands of other persons. This may be due to their genetic inheritance (these might be called "born intellectual prostitutes") while others have learned the need to adjust in order to be able to publish (they might be called "learned intellectual prostitutes"). Some of the born or learned academic prostitutes are masters at predicting what the referees and editors want to see, and from the very beginning introduce it into their papers. The extent of prostitution can then no longer be identified by looking at the changes undertaken in the course of the publication process. The more perfectly the authors are able to anticipate the demands, the less they need to change. Due to the lower cost of meeting the demands for revision, born and learned intellectual prostitutes are more likely to engage in the publication game and to stay in academia. A comparison between autonomous and other-directed persons suggests that the members of a competitively oriented academia tend to be more malleable and more directed towards fulfilling what they see to be the prevailing standards.

### **1.3 Benefits of Publication:**

Some working paper series have started to introduce a refereeing system also for web publications, so that the costs caused by intellectual prostitution are transferred to this publication outlet. In principle, however, anyone can put their papers on the web without having to go through a refereeing process. While attention will be smaller than in well-established official working paper series, it nevertheless opens an effective way of evading intellectual prostitution. The higher level of original and unconventional ideas published on the web may enliven and benefit economics. The discussion of the publication decision process has shown that there are various determinants affecting the likelihood of submitting and revising paper, and therewith accepting academic

prostitution. The weight of these determinants depends not only on personal characteristics ("type of person") but most importantly also on the existing academic system (especially the extent of its competitiveness) and one's position on the career ladder.

## **2. Review of Literature**

Unlike prostitutes who sell their bodies for money (Edlund and Korn, 2002), academics sell their soul to conform to the will of others, the referees and editors, in order to gain one advantage, namely publication. Surprisingly enough, the literature on journal publication does not offer any theory about the behavior of referees. The implicit assumption is that referees act in the interests of science as a whole. Engersand Gans (1998, reprinted in Gans 2000: ) explicitly assume that "referees are motivated by a concern for the quality of research". The notion that individuals act according to general social interest is totally inconsistent with the traditional rational choice model of man (e.g., Becker, 1976; Frey, 1999). Nor is there any well-worked out theory on the behavior of editors. Laband and Piette (1994, reprinted in Gans 2000: 119) state: "to our knowledge, no widely accepted theory of editorial behavior has ever been articulated". In the literature, similar implicit assumptions as those made for referees are current (vandermeulen, 1972; Laband and Piette, 1994). The interests of the journal and the referees are not aligned. The referees find themselves in a classical low cost situation (Kirchgässner, 1992). Their decisions with respect to the evaluation of the papers in their hands has little or no consequences for them, provided they keep to the *formal* rules of the profession. Some authors may subjectively perceive that all that the referees ask is also in their own best interests and in no case leads to a distortion of their own thinking. But such perception can also be viewed as the result of having so much internalized the existing publication process that even the idea of intellectual prostitution is alien. This is a striking case of a reduction in cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957, in economics Akerlof and Dickens, 1982): those individuals prepared to follow the demands of the referees to the letter experience less personal cost if they can convince themselves that this in no way distorts their own thinking.<sup>10</sup> Viewed *ex ante*, however, intellectual prostitution remains an issue. For more advanced scholars, both the time cost and benefits of journal publication is lower. Empirical evidence (Oster and Hamermesh, 1998) suggests that, on balance, the lower benefits of journal publishing at a higher age outweigh the lower cost and that therefore older researchers submit less papers to journals. Rankings of individuals, departments and universities in modern economics are based to a large extent on publications in refereed journals (Graves, Marchand and Thompson, 1982; Laband, 1985; Dusansky and Vernon, 1998). Publications in such journals provide substantial benefits in terms of career, income and internal recognition (Tuckman and Leahey, 1975; Hansen, Weisbrod and Strauss, 1978, Hamermesh, Johnson and Weisbrod, 1982; Diamond, 1986; Saurer, 1988). As already pointed out, scholars at the beginning of their careers derive larger benefits than already established scholars, and therefore are more inclined to undertake journal submissions. In competitive academic systems, citations have become increasingly used as a ranking device (Blaug, 1999; Frey and Eichenberger, 2000). This reduces the importance of journal publications because citations refer to any kind of "publication", including papers put on the web. Some working paper series have started to introduce a refereeing system also for web publications, so that the costs caused by intellectual prostitution are transferred to this publication outlet. In principle, however, anyone can put their papers on the web without having to go through a refereeing process. While attention will be smaller than in well-established official working paper series, it

nevertheless opens an effective way of evading intellectual prostitution. Many authors state that the refereeing process has indeed helped them to improve their papers. According to an empirical analysis undertaken by Laband (1990), referees “add value” to papers. But more importantly in our context, they also often confirm that in order to have their papers accepted, they were “forced” to delete those parts of the paper particularly dear to them. Many authors feel that the refereeing process robbed them of the chance of really contributing what they find important and innovative. An example is given by Brian Arthur, who states that “I put the paper (“Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events”, finally published in the *Economic Journal* 1989) through eight rewrites in this (revision) process; each time it became stiffer, more formal, less informative, and as a result more publishable” (Gans and Shepherd, 1994, reprinted in Gans, 2000). Sometimes the papers published reflect more the referees’ than the author’s ideas. Such stories can often be heard in informal discussion within our profession. There is substantial evidence that economists have gradually been losing their position as important advisors to governments. *The Economist* (1997: 13; 2000: 90), for example, wonders about the “Puzzling Failure of Economics”, and asks “in the long run, is the subject dead?”, or the *New Yorker* (Cassidy, 1996: 50-1) remarks: “. . . a good deal of modern economic theory, even the kind that wins Nobel Prizes, simply does not matter much”. However, as is the case with many other resolutions, it is not easy to act in a time-consistent way. Once one has entered academia, incentives change. There are moral costs to change course once one has been successful and to refrain from intellectual prostitution. As Oster and Hamermesh (1998) empirically show, success breeds later success, i.e., once one has been able to publish in refereed journals, it is easier to continue. Finally, once one belongs to a group or – as Leijorihufvud (1973) states – to a “caste” (here the tenured professional economists in the universities), one tends to identify with it, and finds it costly to deviate from convention. For these cost reasons, it has to be expected that few academics are willing to change once they are in academia. When judging the proposal advanced here, it should not be overlooked that, according to many observers, the present journal publication system attributing veto power to referees does not function that well. This has become clear from the responses by leading economists about their journal submission experiences and the list of “classic” papers once, and often more than once, rejected (Gans and Shepherd, 1994). A well-known example is Akerlof’s “Market for Lemons”, which was rejected by the *American Economic Review* and the *Review of Economic Studies* as being “trivial”, and by the *Journal of Political Economy* for being “too general” before it was accepted by the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, which was instrumental in him winning the Nobel Prize. But whatever one’s opinion about the state of economics, a *comparative* perspective is required. Rankings of individuals, departments and universities in modern economics are based to a large extent on publications in refereed journals (see e.g. Graves, Marchand and Thompson, 1982; Laband, 1985; Dusansky and Vernon, 1998). Publications in such journals provide substantial benefits in terms of career, income and internal recognition (see Tuckman and Leahey, 1975; Hansen, Weisbrod and Strauss, 1978, Hamermesh, Johnson and Weisbrod, 1982; Diamond, 1986; Saurer, 1988). As already pointed out, scholars at the beginning of their careers derive larger benefits than already established scholars, and therefore are more inclined to undertake journal submissions. In competitive academic systems, citations have become increasingly used as a ranking device (see Blaug, 1999; Frey and Eichenberger, 2000). This reduces the importance of journal publications because citations refer to any kind of “publication”, including papers put on the web.

### 3. Objectives of the Study:


1. To study the moral costs of intellectual prostitution.
2. To study the consequences of imposing the refereeing system for prospective readers of the articles.
3. To study the gratification of keeping of the writer's intellectual purity
4. To study the adjustment of the writer's behavior in order to survive.
5. To study the looking for an alternative occupation

### 4. Methodology:

The study is a survey type in nature and was carried out by administering the questionnaire. The study seeks to understand the present problems of research and publications through Personal interview of scholars, Writers, Professional lecturers and through Internet.

### 5. Interpretation of Data:

**Table: Intellectual prostitution in percentage**



In the above table category1 indicates the developed countries, category 2 indicates the developing countries and Category 3 indicates the underdeveloped countries .Series 1 stands for article publication, series 2 stands for Ph.D/D.Litt degrees in Universities and series 3 stand for teaching professionals.

### 6. Findings of the Study:

When writing the first paper, the researcher never expected that it would be published in an English (refereed) journal because it would not be able to pass the refereeing process within a reasonable period of time, if at all. But the researcher is thankful to the quick and resolute action of the editor, H,N.Jagtap of Indian Streams Research Journal(International Recognition Multidisciplinary Research Journal).The author knows that, normally, he would be lucky if, after something like a year or so, he gets an invitation to resubmit the paper according to the demands exactly spelled out by the two to three referees and the editor(s). For most scholars, this is a proposal that cannot be refused, because their survival in academia crucially depends on publications in refereed professional journals.

So far the cost of conforming to the demands of the referees for the would-be authors has been analyzed, but, what about the consequences of imposing the refereeing system for prospective readers of the articles? Perhaps the cost of intellectual prostitution to the authors is fully compensated by the benefits to the readers. The initial purpose of the refereeing system was to select or screen the “best” papers. Only gradually has it evolved into a “censuring” system, making it most difficult to have unconventional ideas accepted. Consider the case of several referees, each having veto power. The probability of an unconventional idea not being vetoed by any of them, nor by the editor(s), is very small because it is highly likely that one of them dislikes a new thought for one of three reasons: the idea is new and therefore more difficult to grasp and appreciate for the referees than are more conventional contributions; the referees are normally leading researchers in the topic treated. They fear the loss of some of their reputation if a new idea is introduced; the new idea is less well formulated than are the well-established ideas and therefore is rejected for lack of rigor. For these reasons, the present refereeing system tends to work against originality, but it may still make a good job of choosing the “good” papers. It is, of course, not possible to state in an absolute way what a “good” paper is. It is only possible to evaluate whether a paper corresponds to the generally accepted criteria which have emerged in a discipline. Circumstantial evidence lends some support to the notion that the present system of academic journal publication does not lead to beneficial outcomes from a broader point of view(except in part for those who have made it in the profession):(1) Many authors state that the refereeing process has indeed helped them to improve their papers. According to an empirical analysis undertaken by the researcher, referees “add value” to papers. But more importantly in our context, they also often confirm that in order to have their papers accepted, they were “forced” to delete those parts of the paper particularly dear to them. Many authors feel that the refereeing process robbed them of the chance of really contributing what they find important and innovative. Sometimes the papers published reflect more the referees’ than the author’s ideas. Such stories can often be heard in informal discussion within our profession. Many preliminary articles circulating in paper form, or available on the web, are known, appreciated and fruitfully used by other scholars. In those cases, the established refereeing process does not seem to be necessary to spark interest in the academic community. One may even advance the hypothesis that the “censored” versions emerging after passing the refereeing process have less impact.

### **7. Recommendations to Reduce Intellectual Prostitution:**

Prostitution, be it sexual or academic, involves choice. It is useful to distinguish between the possibilities individuals have to evade prostitution, given the existing journal editing system, and changing the journal publication system.

#### **7.1 Individual options:**

There are three major ways of reducing the burden of being forced to intellectually prostitute oneself:

(a) Revising papers according to the demands of referees and editor(s) can be taken as purely instrumental to gain entry and tenure into the academic system. But once in, one stops conforming to the undesirable demands. Given reasonable magnitudes of the relevant costs, benefits and parameters (like the probability of final rejection), this normally means that it is more attractive to turn to publication activities with no, or at least less stringent refereeing demands. Conventional possibilities are to write and edit books, contribute to collections of articles or write newspaper columns – or not to publish at all. Increasingly it is possible to put one’s articles on the web or in some

working paper series (provided there is no refereeing process similar to printed journals). However, as is the case with many other resolutions, it is not easy to act in a time-consistent way. Once one has entered academia, incentives change. There are moral costs to change course once one has been successful and to refrain from intellectual prostitution. Finally, once one belongs to a group one tends to identify with it, and finds it costly to deviate from convention. For these cost reasons, it has to be expected that few academics are willing to change once they are in academia.

(b) One can totally refuse to intellectually prostitute oneself by submitting papers to journals accepting papers without the formal refereeing process. This is almost impossible nowadays because non-refereed journals count little, if anything, with respect to crucial academic career decisions. To many readers, this option probably seems naive, or even ridiculous.

(c) One can fight the demands made by the referees and editors. This is again a risky strategy. Academics tend to be prima donnas and do not easily change their conclusions, especially when writing the referee report has cost them much time and effort. To fight back is much easier with formal aspects than with matters of content, which are sometimes tied to ideological preconceptions. Fighting back has, moreover, costs in terms of self-respect. Some authors are too proud to start haggling about a decision taken by other persons.

## **7.2 Changing the Journal Publication System:**

A modest change in the publication procedure would greatly reduce the incidence of intellectual prostitution. The journal's editor(s) should take the basic decision of whether to accept or reject a paper at the outset, based on how interesting they judge the content to be. In some cases, it may be useful to consult other scholars about this basic decision. The appropriate body is the board of editors, which has no function with most journals today. The board exists to provide academic weight to the journal, but also to serve as a clue for what type of papers the journal is interested in. Under this provision, the managing editor(s) should be able to judge whether a paper's content is valuable enough to merit publication in the journal. Because the editor(s) (and possibly the members of the board consulted) would only have to decide whether to accept or reject a paper, the decision can be quickly made. This procedure would greatly reduce two types of cost to the prospective authors: the time cost would be much lower than today, and there would be no prostitution cost, because the acceptance decision would not be conditional on meeting the referees' demands. Only in the second phase would referees be invited to collaborate. They should solely make suggestions on how the paper can be improved. Then the authors can use what they find useful, and can disregard what they do not like. The role of the referees would change. Instead of having to mainly demonstrate how clever they are in destroying the author's ideas, they would now be invited to be supportive. The referees would lose some of their power, in particular they could no longer veto a paper they did not like, because their own ideas are not sufficiently appreciated. As a consequence, there would be an incentive problem. It would become more difficult to get referees. This could be counteracted by giving them the right to publish their dissenting views, together with the original paper. The space allotted for this purpose could be short. It might be argued that the difference in procedure would have no effect on the papers published. Editors would choose the papers they like. The born or learned intellectual prostitutes would again win because they are best able to predict what the editors like. But there is a major difference in the result, due to the different property rights to the journal. The anonymous referees, who have no property rights to the journal, might become active only after the basic

acceptance decision has been made. The editor(s) who have (some) property rights on the journal due to their reputation, would have no incentive to simply accept those papers they personally like. At least to some extent they would be induced to accept papers expected to raise the journal's reputation. They would actively compete for papers they expect to make a future impact on the field; i.e., to be cited much in the future. It may also be claimed that the proposal made is futile because a "good" journal already follows the procedure that the editor(s) decide(s) and the referees only advise. But in most cases, this remains at best an ideal and is not put into practice. Generally, the editors can only accept papers if all the referees agree *after* one or more rounds of revisions. Under the present system, an editor cannot accept a paper he or she likes when the referees advise rejection. Only when the referees' opinions differ and are in clear contradiction, has the editor some discretionary power. Seasoned editors develop skills to extend their discretionary power, mainly by choosing the "right" referees. But there are clear limits to such attempts. With some journals, the decisions are taken by the group of managing editors. While, with the help of their reputation, they have stronger property rights than outside referees, authors only have a chance if they muster the support of the majority, and do not provoke a veto. This system again creates incentives for intellectual prostitution. It may further be questioned whether the authors whose papers have been accepted have sufficient incentive to improve their paper. But rational authors wish to integrate good suggestions offered by the referees. It is in the authors' own best interests to carefully listen to the suggestions for improvement – but this is quite distinct from being "forced" to follow the changes demanded by the referees. Yet another concern may be that the editors are unable to fulfill the more extensive role attributed to them. The major role of the referees cannot be discarded without loss of quality in publications. This is debatable because, due to the missing property rights, the referees' interests are not in line with the journal seeking their advice. Scholars are asked to referee a paper without knowing anything about the quality of the *other* papers under consideration for publication. Referees thus have to try to decide according to some mystical absolute standards rather than be able to select the relatively best paper from those submitted. The editors, in contrast, do have this knowledge and are therefore well equipped to make the basic initial decision. When judging the proposal advanced here, it should not be overlooked that, according to many observers, the present journal publication system attributing veto power to referees does not function that well. No publication procedure, including the one existing at present, produces perfect results. It is therefore necessary to compare the imperfect results produced by the modest change in the publication process suggested here to the equally imperfect results of the present system.

#### **8. Suggestions:**

It is not possible to avoid intellectual prostitution completely. It is simply the reflection of scarcity forcing scholars to adjust. Room for publication, especially in renowned journals, is much smaller than the number of articles that scholars want to place. Rejection rates of percent are quite common with many journals. As elsewhere in the economy, the suppliers of services – here ideas contained in articles – must adjust to the demanders' wishes. In this sense we are all prostitutes. But a different view may be entertained. Scholars may be compared to artists, who we expect to express their own original ideas and convictions. We do not simply expect them to produce what the market wants. Production for the market was the rule in the Middle Ages, and painters and musicians were simple artisans who had to do what their customers wanted. But the Renaissance brought a complete reorientation: artists were given the right to

express themselves with as few restrictions as possible. The result was an explosion in *creativity*, Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo Buonarroti being the best-known examples. If scholars are to be original in a similar way to artists today, they have to be given as much independence as possible. This principle has been accorded to universities a long time ago, and is rightly guarded by them. It has also brought about an explosion of innovation never seen before. It is important to acknowledge that many different procedures are feasible and are used in other disciplines.

The researcher thinks journal publishing is like so many things in academic life: it just hasn't kept up with the way the rest of the world has changed, and so mostly it conforms to the most conservative tendencies. The thing that the researcher would gripe about most is how finding long it takes to get any feedback at all. Furthermore, regarding the hopeless waiting for the publication of a research article is a serious concern. The editors monopolize the time and a quarry from the researcher regarding the publication gets anti intellectual response as not to question the credentials of the editors. These are certainly fatal to the intellectual prosperity of the individuals in particular and the world in general. No publication procedure, including the one existing at present, produces perfect results. It is therefore necessary to compare the imperfect results produced by the modest change in the publication process suggested here to the equally imperfect results of the present system. A modest proposal designed to substantially reduce the "need" to prostitute oneself in order to publish and be academically successful. It seeks to overcome the veto power of (anonymous) referees. It may be proposed that the editor makes an initial decision whether a paper is worth publishing or not. The referees are only asked to give suggestions on how to improve the paper. The author is free to follow or to disregard this advice.

The researcher thinks it's important to distinguish between a potential problem with procedure and instances of bad practice – such as intellectual theft, inefficient editors/referee, etc. Most of the problems people seem to be having result from people not doing their part of the process well. A more pertinent problem with the emphasis on publications in academia is that they are some sort of (perhaps flawed) measure of someone's ability to carry out research. Survival in academia depends on publications in refereed journals. Authors only get their papers accepted if they intellectually prostitute themselves by slavishly following the demands made by anonymous referees who have no property rights to the journals they advise. Intellectual prostitution is neither beneficial to suppliers nor consumers. But it is avoidable. The editor (with property rights to the journal) should make the basic decision of whether a paper is worth publishing or not. The referees should only offer suggestions for improvement. The author may disregard this advice. This reduces intellectual prostitution and produces more original publications.

## **9. Conclusion:**

The existing refereeing process commonly used journals essentially grants veto power to any referee. But the interests of the referees are not aligned with those of the journal. Due to reputation effects, the editors' incentives are more in line but they are certainly not identical with those of the journal. Editors accept referees' vetoes not least because it relieves them of some of the burden of the many rejections that scarcity of journal space imposes. Yet the results of this publication process are most unsatisfactory. The authors are forced to follow closely, if not slavishly, referees' demands, as they know that they otherwise cannot publish and pursue an academic career. The proposal developed here considers scholars to be like artists, who must be given much room for expressing themselves. This can be achieved by three changes,

which make the proposal superior to the existing publication procedure: (1) The *editors* decide autonomously whether a submitted paper is interesting and original and accept or reject it for publication. This makes their work more attractive. (2) *Referees* are invited to suggest non-binding improvements. Those with fundamental objections to the paper are invited to summarize their views on one or two pages after the published article. This provides an incentive to referee more carefully. (3) The *authors* of accepted papers introduce those recommendations they find useful. They keep full control over their paper and can be more innovative. These changes should be able to: reduce authors' incentives to intellectually prostitute themselves; speed up the publication decision process; and bolster authors' creativity, leading to more innovative and relevant articles.

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